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Abstract The paper discusses Bernard Bolzano’s epistemological approach to
believing and knowing with regard to the epistemic requirements of an axiomatic
model of science. It relates Bolzano’s notions of believing, knowing and evaluation
to notions of infallibility, immediacy and foundational truth. If axiomatic systems
require their foundational truths to be infallibly known, this knowledge involves both
evaluation of the infallibility of the asserted truth and evaluation of its being foun-
dational. The twofold attempt to examine one’s assertions and to do so by searching
for the objective grounds of the truths asserted lies at the heart of Bolzano’s notion of
knowledge. However, the explanatory task of searching for grounds requires methods
that cannot warrant infallibility. Hence, its constitutive role in a conception of knowl-
edge seems to imply the fallibility of such knowledge. I argue that the explanatory
task contained in Bolzanian knowing involves a high degree of epistemic virtues, and
that it is only through some salient virtue that the credit of infallibility can distinguish
Bolzanian knowing from a high degree of Bolzanian believing.
Keywords Believing · Knowing · Infallibility · Immediacy · Foundational truth ·
Epistemic evaluation · Explanation · Epistemic virtue
1 Introduction
My discussion of Bernard Bolzano’s conception of knowledge and its relation to the
epistemic requirements of an axiomatic system presupposes that Bolzano is a parti-
san of the traditional axiomatic model of science.1 Consequently, his epistemology is
1 For details, see de Jong and Betti (2008) and Lapointe (2008).
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committed to the epistemic requirements of the model, summarized in the following
principles: (a) all propositions in a system S are known to be true (a non-fundamen-
tal proposition is known to be true through its proof in S), and (b) all concepts in S
are adequately known (a non-fundamental concept is adequately known through its
composition or definition).2 For the present purpose, I will restrain considerations to
the scope of principle (a) that embraces, on the one hand, rules of inference and the
extent of their application, and, on the other hand, the epistemic status of axioms or
foundational truths.3 The latter concern divides into the question of how to know axi-
oms to be true and the question of how to know them to be foundational. Answers to
these questions are often given in terms of impregnable or self-evident beliefs. Another
option is to say that axioms are just stated. In this case, due to their hypothetical status
no truth-value can be ascribed to them. Here, the question is for the epistemic status
of hypotheses, as well as for assertions of the form “[p] is a foundational truth in S”.4
If axioms are imported from the domain of another science, the question of founda-
tional knowledge is reported to that domain. Then, foundational knowledge seems to
be dependent on the coherence of scientific systems or on a hierarchy of scientific
systems in which the question of foundation recurs.
Often, axiomatic models of science go together with foundationalist epistemologi-
cal accounts that explain knowledge and justification in terms of foundational beliefs
being “self-evident” or resulting from some special epistemic faculty—for example
“intuition”. The main objections to foundationalism query the lack of criteria for self-
evidence, as well as the arbitrariness of intuitional faculties. Bolzano aligns with this
criticism, opposing vehemently all claims for intuitional insight as justificatory of
infallibility (Bolzano 1837a §315, annotation).5 He supports, on the other hand, the
idea of infallible knowledge resulting from “immediate judgments”.6 Yet, he equally
admits a substantial lack of criteria for these latter. Therefore, his epistemology can-
not be qualified as essentially foundationalist, in spite of some strong foundationalist
claims with regard to the ultimate truths of all sciences. The best fitting contempo-
2 Following de Jong and Betti (2008).
3
“Given the difference between fundamental and non-fundamental elements, the Model has to accommo-
date two kinds of justification, one for the fundamental, and one for the non-fundamental elements. […]
Grounded knowledge is to be intended as knowledge propter quid or demonstrative knowledge […]. Scien-
tific knowledge according to the postulate of grounded knowledge is knowledge which is also explanative;
in it the ordo cognoscendi matches the ordo essendi.” (de Jong and Betti 2008).
4 I will use the following notations:
[p]: for a proposition stating p
[P]: for a collection of [p]
“p”: for a subjective representation of p
“p!”: for a judgment (assertion) of [p].
5 All quotes from Bolzano 1837a: author’s translation.
6 The argument for this claim is typically foundationalist: “It is equally certain that there are also immediate
judgments; for the existence of mediated ones can in the end be understood only because there are also
immediate judgments” (Bolzano 1837b §300.3; cf. §300.11). For the claim of necessary trustworthiness of
immediate judgments, Bolzano argues in terms of anti-skepticism: “But if you consider […] possible […]
that one of your immediately formed judgments is false or that one of your immediate forms of inference
is invalid, then you must distrust indeed not only some, but all your immediate judgments and forms of
inference. For all of them have only one and the same warrant, namely your immediate consciousness. You
[…] should therefore not form any judgments at all” (Bolzano 1837b §42).
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rary label for Bolzano’s approach is Virtue Epistemology in its responsibilist version,
which combines reliabilist concerns for epistemic success with internalist concerns
for agentive responsibility for knowledge.
In the following, I shall first give an overview of Bolzano’s use of central episte-
mological terms and then focus on the question of infallible knowledge. I will show
how the claim for the existence of infallible assertions is related to the exhortation to
test one’s judgments. Bolzano characterizes such testing not primarily as an epistemic
duty but, rather, as an act of epistemic nobleness essentially connected with the zeal
to increase knowledge. The most important goal in increasing knowledge is explana-
tory; that is, to advance as far as to the objective grounds of an asserted truth.7 I will
outline how these supreme epistemic values call for a legitimation of “inverted” ways
to knowledge, as well as for an ineluctably virtue-based epistemic ethics.
2 Epistemological notions
In the introductory part of his seminal work Theory of science (Wissenschaftslehre),
Bolzano connects science (Wissenschaft) with knowledge (Wissen) in the following
words:
I therefore take the liberty to call an aggregate of truths of a certain kind a sci-
ence [Wissenschaft], if what is known of it is important enough to be set forth
in a special book. […] For instance, I shall call the class of all truths which
assert something about the constitution of space the science of space (geom-
etry), because these propositions form a separate species of truths. (Bolzano
1837b §1.1)
Bolzano formulates this “Domain Postulate”8 not only in terms of a class of truths
determined by a specific set of objects, but also in the pragmatic terms of its worth
for a community of knowers. Apart from being a mere domain of objective truths,
then, a science is moreover a domain of knowledge. Thus, the logic providing the
rules to direct scientific (or more broadly epistemic) agency is a logic whose concept
is close to that of epistemic logic. According to Nicholas Rescher, epistemic logic is
“applied logic” which has to reflect the “ultimately factual circumstances” of intel-
ligent beings’ cognitive situation. Therefore, the theses of such a logical system are
considered to “stand correlative to the ways in which we actually do talk and think
about the matter”.9
While the term “knowledge” in the expression “domain of knowledge” is unspeci-
fied, meaning roughly “correct assertions supported in an acceptable way”, the same
term will be given a specific meaning in epistemological considerations. In Bolzano’s
epistemology (Erkenntnistheorie), however, “knowing” is not the central term. Rather,
it is an epistemology centered on the notions of “judgment” (Urteil) and “cognition”
(Erkenntnis)—corresponding to the contemporary labels “belief” and “true belief”—
7 For Bolzano’s theory of grounding see Tatzel (2002) and Lapointe (2008).
8 On the Domain Postulate see the introduction and de Jong and Betti (2008).
9 Rescher (2005, p. 5).
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as well as on the notion of “inference” (Schliessen). The primary epistemic act is
judging, that is “taking for true” (asserting) a certain objective proposition. Judging
can be either “immediate” or “mediated” by inference. In Bolzano’s view, believing
(Glauben) and knowing (Wissen) are secondary to judging in that they name reflective
attitudes of epistemic agents towards their judgments (Bolzano 1837a §321). Believ-
ing and knowing are introduced as attitudes resulting from assessing the fallibility of
judgments. While an immediate judgment is supposed to have fallibility 0—default
infallibility—the fallibility of inferred judgments depends on the way they are inferred.
If the inference is “perfect deduction”, that is, starts from correct assertions and fol-
lows deductive rules properly, the resulting judgment is infallible. If, on the other
hand, there is uncertainty as to the correctness of premises asserted or rule following,
the inferred judgment is fallible.10 Consequently, the reflective attitude towards such
a judgment is Bolzanian believing, while Bolzanian knowing reflects the assessment
of one’s judgment as infallible.
It follows from the foregoing that Bolzano’s specified concept of knowledge is
internalist: an analysis of “A knows that p” essentially involves agent A’s subjective
appraisal of her judgmental activity. Bolzano seems to take it for granted that epistemic
agents have a kind of primitive self-attitude towards their cognitive processes, simi-
larly to what Keith Lehrer labels as “self-trust”,11 and that this attitude, if reflected, is
manifested in knowing and believing. On the other hand, Bolzano assumes that judg-
mental activity naturally runs in the direction of its intrinsic aim of asserting truth.
This “teleological reliabilism” is based in his metaphysics of the mind that links the
causality of mental processes with the necessity of logical laws. With regard to the
ontological status of the mind, Bolzano defends a substance monism, according to
which a mind or “soul” is the “ruling substance” within an “organic” aggregate of
substances, called a “body”.12 Since substances are defined as self-sustaining effi-
cacious simples and are efficacious in virtue of having causal “forces”, this position
suggests that the activity of the mind is to be accounted for in causal terms. Given
such an account, the activity of a mental substance consists in its running causal pro-
cesses that are governed by the laws of mental forces. These processes are taken to be
reliable ways to achieve the epistemic aim of judgments’ truth-conformity. Bolzano
emphasizes the reliability of causal cognitive processes by linking causal and logical
necessity in his notion of the ground-consequence relation (Abfolge), for which state-
ments on causal relations count as paradigmatic instantiations. The strong emphasis
on a causalist account of the properties of mental substances, together with the teleo-
logical claim that these properties unfold in processes that are truth-aimed, results in
the reliabilist optimism that epistemic processes achieve their aim of truth-conformity
if they function properly in appropriate circumstances. In Bolzano’s epistemology,
this externalist feature of process reliabilism meshes with the internalist feature of
reflective assessment of one’s epistemic procedures. The meshing becomes salient in
10 Bolzano defines doubt in terms of degrees of probability of confidence, and confidence as indicating
either immediacy of judgment or the truth-probability of a proposition [q] in relation to a set of premises.
11
“The first step in the life of reason is self-trust. I trust myself in what I accept and prefer, and I consider
myself worthy of my trust in what I accept or prefer” (Lehrer 1997, p. 5).
12 See, for example, Berg (1976); Chisholm (1991); Krause (2004).
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terms such as “judgmental force”, “representational force”, “imaginative force” and
so on. Here, the intentionalist vocabulary—traditionally used to account for subjec-
tively accessible and manageable activities—combines with the reliabilist vocabulary
of processual occurrence. Accordingly, epistemological notions such as “judging” are
accounted for both in intentionalist terms (asserting the truth of an objective proposi-
tion), and in functionalist terms of subliminal processes that concatenate more or less
strong “ideas” into a propositionally structured entity of thought.
Although internal epistemic processes run mostly unnoticed, they are not immune
to beneficial or malefic influence. Epistemic practice shapes them in various ways, just
as aesthetic and moral practice sharpen or weaken the faculties upon which they rely.
Insofar, Bolzano’s process reliabilism concerning judgmental activity is balanced by
strong responsibilist claims concerning epistemic agency. The endeavor of epistemic
performance is presented as a dimension of essentially ethical concern, determined not
only in normative terms like “ought”, “allowed” or “forbidden”, but also in moral terms
like “illicit” or “immoral” that emphasize epistemic responsibility (Bolzano 1837b
§317.3).13 If, for example, circumstances and indices for truth-conformity make it
illicit not to accept a thought as cognition, the resulting conviction should correctly be
called an “ethical, or moral, or sufficient” certainty (ibid.). This attitude corresponds to
a large extent to ideas of virtue epistemology that attempt to amend the consequential-
ism of reliabilist accounts by adding the aspect of agentive responsibility to analyses
of knowledge (see, for example, the work of J. Greco, L. Zagzebski, C. Hookway).
An example of a virtue epistemological approach to knowledge is Linda Zagzebski’s
argument that the reliability of a process cannot confer any added value to its result,
since the process receives its own value from the fact that it leads to the given result.
So if knowledge shall be more valuable than reliably true belief, the additional value
cannot be explained in terms of the reliability of the process leading to it. The expla-
nation must, instead, refer to motivational attitudes that initiate and sustain the actions
and processes leading to true belief.14 Similarly, Bolzano’s Theory of science empha-
sizes the responsibility of epistemic agents to make sure that their practices meet the
high standards of epistemic ethics. For example, the scenario of epistemically irre-
sponsible agents whose epistemic failings are constantly adjusted by a reliable demon
Verity into the full success of exclusively true beliefs would not fit the conception of
Bolzanian knowing.15 To be valuable, a concept of knowledge needs to relate notions
of subjective responsibility in the search for truth with notions of success in reaching
this aim. In the following, I will relate this point to what Bolzano says on the respon-
sibility of testing one’s judgments and explaining the truths asserted in them. I try to
show, on the one hand, that the norms for these activities are aretaic rather than deontic
13
“If the absolute probability of a proposition for a certain being is very large and if there are circumstances
which make it foolish or illicit to consider the possibility of the opposite and to act on it, then I call these
propositions trustworthy, secure, reliable” (Bolzano 1837b §317.3).
14 Zagzebski (2000) account of knowledge can be expressed in the following scheme:
S knows that p iff
(i) S has a “motive for truth”, &
(ii) S behaves in a cognitively reliable manner because of (i), &
(iii) S successfully reaches the true belief that p because of (ii).
15 See Swank (2000).
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in nature and, on the other hand, that they must account for the epistemic requirements
of axiomatic systems.
3 Infallibility and immediacy of judgment
Let us now come back to the aforementioned attitudes of Bolzanian believing and
knowing that reflect one’s appraisal of one’s judgment as either fallible or infallible.
I take it that these evaluative attitudes have to be construed in terms of non-assertive
thoughts, which, although cognitive in nature (conceptual or even propositional) may
involve feelings and intentions as components. Compare, for example, the notion of
“self-trust” mentioned above. A construal of believing and knowing in terms of higher-
order judgments—agent A’s judgment “r !” assesses A’s judgment “q!” by asserting
the latter’s certainty or degree of subjective probability16—induces an undesirable
infinite regress.17 In order to avoid such evaluator regress, Bolzanian believing and
knowing are to be explained as normative attitudes whose analyses refer to a broader
realm of mental states than those usually treated as epistemically relevant. As a first
approach, they can be analyzed in the following way (Bolzano 1837a §321):
(1) A knowsB that [q] iff A asserts [q] & A truly evaluates her asserting [q] as infal-
lible.
(2) A believesB that [q] iff A asserts [q] & A evaluates her asserting [q] as fallible.
The analysis of “knowing” does not need to mention the traditional clause of [q]’s
being true, since infallibility of assertion implies truth-conformity. The analysis’ crit-
ical point lies in the correct evaluation of infallibility. If this evaluation is not itself
infallible and A can be wrong about it, subjective and objective attribution of knowl-
edge cannot be reconciled. In the analysis of “believing”, however, a wrong evaluation
of fallibility does not make a significant difference, since fallibility and truth-confor-
mity are not related in the same way. If A evaluates “q!” as fallible on the basis of
[q]’s probability P < 1, this evaluation allows for [q]’s being true, and hence for A’s
judgment “q!” to conform to truth. Bolzanian believing can be described as loyalty
to a judgment “q!”, as a “relation of our ethos (Gesinnung)” to the truth of [q], in
spite of there being reasons against it (Bolzano 1837a §321). Believing is intimately
connected to the virtue of trust that presupposes an agent’s acknowledging the risk of
16
“Certainty” (Gewissheit) and “Confidence” (Zuversicht) are notions that qualify judgments in function
of the deducibility or probability of objective propositions. Roughly, confidence with regard to a judgment
“q!” is the subjective probability of the judgment’s conforming to truth (Bolzano 1837a §§317–320). For
the notions of deducibility and probability see Sect. 4.
17 For a similar idea see John Greco’s remarks on subjective justification (S’s believing p is the result of
dispositions that S manifests when S is trying to believe the truth): “The knower must have some awareness
that a belief so formed has a good likelihood of being true. Some authors have required that the knower
believe that this is so, but […] it seems that people rarely have beliefs about the genesis of their beliefs, and
so it would be too strong to require that they always have one in cases of knowledge. […] People manifest
highly specific, finely tuned dispositions to form beliefs in some ways rather than others. And this fact,
I take it, amounts to an implicit awareness of the reliability of those dispositions.” (Greco 2003, p. 127f)
To be noted: the term “belief” in Greco’s use corresponds to the term “judgment” in Bolzano’s use, not to
Bolzanian believing.
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being deceived.18 Based on an evaluation that reveals good reasons and due attention
to counterarguments, believing will not be disavowed in a significant way. If “q!” has
a high degree of “confidence”, the chance of it not conforming to truth may be so low
that it would be epistemically “vicious” not to behave as if [q] were true. Believing
is, on the other hand, also connected to the virtue of prudence that dissuades one from
holding onto a judgment that has too many reasons against it. Believing is at home in
the interplay of trust and prudence.
Similar considerations apply, although in a different manner, to Bolzanian know-
ing. While Bolzano assumes that infallibility is a default property of immediate, that
is, non-inferential, judgments, he equally assumes that there are no definite criteria
to distinguish immediate judgments from “unconsciously inferred” judgments. Since
both are experienced as immediate, the virtuous epistemic agent will not lightheart-
edly evaluate an experience of immediacy as an indicator of infallibility. Contrary to
those philosophers who pretend to “immediately cognize all the truths that they, each
one in his system, establish” (Bolzano 1837a §315), she will not take experienced
immediacy as unconditional justification for dogmatic claims. With regard to experi-
enced immediacy, the salient virtue is prudence. Prudence does not exclude trust or
amount to mistrust, but frames trust with a caveat. Testing a judgment even if it seems
immediate is motivated mainly by the desire to bring the grounds of the asserted truth
to full awareness, not by one’s doubting the judgment. Although Bolzano suggests
that there are globally foundational truths, that is, truths that do not have any objective
grounds, he desists from trying to list such truths.19
Our judgments, even truly immediate—hence infallible—judgments, generally
assert grounded truths. So even if there is no epistemic duty to justify a judgment
by providing its reasons, there are epistemic virtues motivating the search for the
grounds of the asserted truth. Bolzano emphasizes that this kind of investigating is
a “business that we can undertake even then when we do not doubt the truth of the
proposition in the least” (Bolzano 1837a §332.8). His “Heuristics” in the Theory of
science (Bolzano 1837a §§322–391) is a strong plea for this point.
It is apposite to mention at this point that the concepts of Bolzanian believing and
knowing do not imply continuous reflective appraisal of one’s judgments. The big
part of epistemic activity runs without being accompanied by reflective awareness and
is nevertheless able to compensate for errors. Insofar, Bolzano’s epistemology draws
importantly on ideas that nowadays are labeled as “Naturalized Rationality”, postu-
lating reasoning processes that are reliable, fast and frugalenough for the demands of
a normal human life. As current research programs suggest, simple heuristics such as
recognition, take-the-best and take-the-last prove “remarkably successful” and “per-
form almost as well as a bunch of fancier processing algorithms”, while being much
more frugal in the use of information and the demands placed on the computational
18 See for example Baier (1992).
19 Compare Sebestik (1992, p. 282): “It is paradoxal that Bolzano who renews the conception of the
axiomatic does not establish in his Grössenlehre any proposition declared expressly as primitive truth or
principle. Bolzano does not propose any list of axioms” (my translation).
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resources of a system.20 For many epistemic purposes, such minimal heuristics are
sufficient.
Yet for more specific epistemic purpose such as establishing the foundational
structure of a scientific system, appropriate heuristics demand that a selection of the
assertions to be thoroughly checked is made. Even assertions of “self-evident” prop-
ositions considered to provide the foundational truths of a system merit investigation.
Self-evidence might manifest in immediacy of judgment—but due to the phenomenal
indistinguishability of immediate judgments and those achieved through unconscious
(fallible) inference one should be careful about experienced immediacy. Having chosen
to test an assertion, epistemic agents “ascend” a hierarchical order of grounds—Bolz-
ano’s Abfolge—towards the most general principles that can explain the asserted truth
(Bolzano 1837a §220). The pathway followed may furcate repeatedly and lead to dif-
ferent possible explanations. Aside from the logical and semantic relations involved, it
is the circumstances of investigation and the attitudes of the agents that determine the
choices of ways and the extent of investigation in the course of their ascent. Whether
an investigation has achieved the ultimate grounds is not easy to decide. Choosing “to
abandon our testing and rightly so” at a given point springs from a pragmatic attitude
involving many epistemic virtues that evaluate the results achieved so far, the resources
available and the benefits and costs of further research (Bolzano 1837a §332.3).
Our initial question was whether the requirement of knowing the foundational prin-
ciples of a system S can be accommodated within the frame of Bolzanian knowing.
Applying the analysis of Bolzanian knowing to the epistemic requirement of axiomatic
systems, we get the following form:
(3) A knowsB that [p] is a foundational truth in S iff A asserts that [p] is a foundational
truth in S & A truly evaluates her asserting so as infallible.
Bolzanian knowledge claims apply only to assertions. Since hypothesis is distinct
from assertion, Bolzanian knowing cannot be claimed for the hypothesized axioms of
a system conceived in hypothetico-deductive terms. Furthermore, it cannot be claimed
for “[p] is a foundational truth in S”. Suppose that heuristic rules lead us “up” from
some acknowledged truths [Q] to more basic truths they derive from. The method is
hypothetical or conditional in nature: we consider from what relevant set of truths [P]
our initial truths [Q] can be inferred. No assertion of any [p] is needed in order to eval-
uate whether [P] entails [Q]. But plausibly, once the cogency of [P]’s entailing [Q] is
established, we are inclined to assert the propositions in [P] in their right as axioms of
our system, and hence to assert a proposition of the form “[p] is a foundational truth
in S”. Such an assertion, however, does not seem to be entailed by logical necessity.
We can abstain from it, considering the propositions in [P] as axioms of our system
in a hypothetical mode. Doing so, we leave open the possibility of more appropriate
axioms being found. If we assert the propositions in [P] to be the axioms of S, this
assertion can result in two ways: either it ensues from probabilistic inference, or it is a
decisional “leap”. In the first case, our epistemic attitude is just a variety of Bolzanian
believing whose underlying evaluation revealed a high degree of probability. In the
second case, the epistemic attitude seems to differ from believing since the awareness
20 Carruthers (2006).
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of potential error implied in believing is simply set at nought. If infallibility is to be
preserved in Bolzanian knowing, it implies taking a decisional leap. Taking such a
leap is epistemically daring: it is motivated rather by audaciousness than by trust and
prudence.
As mentioned before, evaluating one’s own assertion as infallible is the critical
clause in the analysis of Bolzanian knowing. So far I have mentioned three features
with regard to this problem. First, it seems that infallibility evaluation cannot itself
be assertive, but rather has the character of a thought in the unspecified sense of
a structured complex of concepts.21 Second, immediacy of judgment is not a suffi-
cient condition for infallibility, since unconsciously inferred judgments appear equally
immediate to the judging agent. Thus, in the case of apparently immediate judgment,
the task of infallibility evaluation amounts to the evaluation of authentic immedi-
acy. Third, perfect deduction that warrants a conclusion’s infallibility is dependent on
infallibility claims concerning its premises. Unless not all antecedent judgments have
probability 1—and hence infallibility—deductive inference will not be perfect, even
if the argument is valid. Thus, evaluation of an inference’s infallibility amounts to
evaluation of the infallibility of its premises, and we are either in a regress or thrown
back to the problem of evaluating immediacy. In view of this situation, the choice
is between rejecting the infallibility claim categorically or attempting to save it by
providing an account of immediacy evaluation. I will adopt the latter option.
4 Immediacy evaluation
The question of immediacy evaluation leads back to reliabilist considerations. For
Bolzano, judging is the mental activity of asserting an objective proposition. Yet in
order to assert an objective proposition [q], an agent A does not simply “grasp” the
ready-made proposition [q] from the objective realm of propositions and adds her
approval to it. Rather, A’s asserting [q] is considered the result of processes that involve
various constructive mental “forces”. Although the big part of A’s constructive activity
runs unnoticed, this is no reason to distrust its results.22 According to Bolzano, the
cognitive process leading to a judgment is governed by what he calls the “judgmental
force” (Urteilskraft), a force that concatenates a number of mental representations
into propositionally structured complexes in a way that enforces approbation. Since
Bolzano holds that all mental representations—whether simple or complex—mirror
objective representations, there is no propositionally structured subjective representa-
tion that does not mirror an objective proposition. Therefore, what is “taken for true”
or approved in judging is justly said to be the objective proposition [q] providing the
21
“I feel the truth of p” refers to an evaluative attitude whose comprehended thought is conceptually
complex but not necessarily propositionally structured. Even paraphrasing “I feel the truth of p” by “I feel
that p is true” does not amount to claiming that the content of the feeling is a judgment, viz. assertive and
in need of justification.
22 Bolzano thinks that the processes resulting in complex representations and judgments are “much more
easily comprehended” when we assume “that in doing this the mind [Seele] does not form the judgment that
it does it, but that it performs these operations without being clearly conscious of them” (Bolzano 1837b
§302.1).
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“matter” of the subjectively built representation “q”. Operations of the “judgmental
force” may or may not go together with operations of the “force of inference”. In the
first case, the judgment produced presupposes the “presence” of other judgments in
the mind which then are “the complete cause for the occurrence” of “q!” (Bolzano
1837b §300.2). Here, approbation of [q] is mediated by the mind’s “moving” from
these antecedent judgments to judgment “q!”. In the second case, a judgment “q!” is
“immediate” in that the approbation of [q] is independent of inferential moves. Agent
A’s non-conceptual judgment “I feel a pain just now”, for example, might gain its
immediate approbation from the fact that it expresses an actually experienced physi-
cal state of A. For purely conceptual judgments, Bolzano claims that the compulsion
for immediate approbation bears exclusively on the meaning of the concepts from
which they are built and the relations between them:23
To the full reason why we couch our judgment in just that way, why we claim
that each object represented by the concept A has the property represented by the
concept b […] belongs primarily also the peculiar property of both the concepts
A and b themselves. […] it is obvious that—in order to explain the appearance
of such a judgment in our mind (Gemüt)—we must not mention anything else
[…] than that we envisage by A and b just those concepts that we really envisage
(vorstellen) (Bolzano 1837a §302).24
Claims for infallibility of this kind of judgments draw on the semantic properties of
the representations involved to produce immediate assertion. Bolzano does not dis-
tinguish subjective from objective representations by declaring the latter as “sense”
or “meaning” of the former. Rather, the distinction is expressed in terms of the “real
existence” of mental phenomena—adhering to individual subjects and having causal
efficacy—that instantiate or exemplify a “certain something” which “subsists” and
constitutes their “immediate matter (Stoff)” (Bolzano 1837b §48.3).25 The semantics
of representations is determined by their “content”, which is the “sum of the compo-
nents” a representation consists of, and the order of these components (Bolzano 1837b
§56). In general, a subjective representation “F” and its objective matter [F] do have
the same content which enables them to fulfill their task of representing their common
object (Bolzano 1837a §49.1). Agent A’s “having” a representation “F” is a mental
instance of [F] that mirrors the semantic morphology of [F] and goes together with the
understanding of “expressions” or “signs” that “signify” [F] (Bolzano 1837a §§79.2).
If A has a propositionally structured conceptual representation “q”, A apprehends
23 In Bolzano, a concept (Begriff) is a representation which is not an intuition (Anschauung) and does not
contain any intuition. An intuition is defined as a semantically simple representation of a singular object,
paradigmatically instantiated in the demonstrative [this]. A non-conceptual judgement is a judgment con-
taining intuitions, a (purely) conceptual judgment does not contain intuitions.
24
“[W]hether we make a judgment or not […] is a result […] merely of the sum total of the ideas
immediately present in our souls, according to a certain law of necessity” (Bolzano 1837c §291.5).
25 Bolzano uses the term “sense” or “meaning” (Sinn) with the complement noun “expression” or “sign”,
not with the complement noun “representation”. Although in one place he qualifies an objective proposition
as a “meaning”, he does not qualify it as the meaning of a subjective representation but as the meaning of a
“linguistic expression” (Bolzano 1839, §2.1; Bolzano 1837a §285). The notion of subjective representation
is wider than that of linguistic expression.
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[q] and understands linguistic signs signifying [q]. According to Bolzano’s claim, the
compulsion for immediate approbation is triggered in this case by A’s having under-
standingly ordered a number of components into a complex, so that—under given
epistemic circumstances—this ordered semantic complex manifests in the assertion
“A is b!”. It is also possible, though, that an identical judgment “A is b!” is mediated
by conscious or unconscious inference. The class of judgments that are absolutely
non-inferable by virtue of their semantic properties, i.e. their content„ is apparently
empty. This fact makes it impossible to provide a structural feature to distinguish
immediate judgments. Together with the fact of process opacity in the generation of
judgments it rules out the possibility of absolute evaluation of infallibility.
As an anti-intuitionist conception of knowing that involves reflective evaluation of
one’s own epistemic performance, Bolzanian knowing seems restricted to approxi-
mate evaluation of infallibility.26 To maximize evaluation success, an agent needs to
combine her skills in following acquired rules of testing with virtues motivating her
choices as to the limits of such testing. Maximizing evaluation success also requires
submitting the results for evaluation by others. Bolzano depicts a subjectivist episte-
mology, yet it is not individualist in the sense that it describes epistemic agency as
a monadic activity. Epistemic agents are part of epistemic communities whose stan-
dards they adapt. Epistemic processes are not restricted to cognitive processes running
in natural individuals, but also include collective processes of collecting, selecting,
assimilating and distributing information. Bolzano factors this collective dimension
into his epistemology by strong references to “common sense” that manifests, for
example, in consensus and in the use of a common semiotic system in tracking truth.
Bolzanian knowing seems to rely on an evaluation of infallibility that consists in the
maximal combination of individual and collective abilities.
Yet if Bolzanian knowing relies on mere approximate evaluation of infallibility,
then it seems to be just a higher level or an ideal case of Bolzanian believing and its
evaluation of fallibility. If infallibility cannot be tracked in an absolute way, there is
no point in making such tracking the definitional criterion of knowing. An attempt
to save knowing as different from believing apparently requires an additional crite-
rion that provides the value of the absolute. As briefly outlined, I think that such a
criterion can be found in the difference between salient virtues involved in believing
and knowing. Before tackling this topic again, I should like to present some fea-
tures of Bolzanian heuristics that combine the responsibility of testing one’s judg-
ments with the task of searching the grounds of the truths asserted. This twofold
task lies at the heart of both the evaluation of fallibility in believing and the evalu-
ation of infallibility in knowing. Based on these heuristic requirements, the differ-
ence between salient virtues involved in believing and knowing will appear more
articulate.
26 I use the term “anti-intuitionist” in the broad sense of denoting an epistemological position that defies
the existence of a specific “intuitive” epistemic faculty allowing direct insight into the truth of a proposition.
In Bolzano 1837a §315 (annotation) Bolzano criticizes the intuitionist position, especially if it is used to
dogmatically establish one’s philosophical system. (This meaning of the term “intuition” differs from the
one referred to in note 23. The English word “intuition” translates both the German “Anschauung” (a type
of representation) and the German “Intuition” (an epistemic faculty)).
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5 Heuristics and virtue
The heuristics of searching the grounds of asserted truths presupposes a testing of
judgments that is not motivated by doubts in the judgment or requests for justification
but by a desire to reveal the objective grounds of the truth upon which a judgment bears.
Love of truth and zeal to explain are considered to be the driving attitudes in epistemic
and more specific scientific activity.27 Bolzano’s heuristics is, as his entire epistemol-
ogy, deeply rooted in ethical concerns, which are much more aretaic in nature than
consequentialist or deontic. Within heuristics, it is primarily inductive and abductive
reasoning that are within the scope of epistemic virtues. Contrary to rule-governed
deductive reasoning, which is strictly valid or invalid and, as such, relatively insen-
sitive to ethical concern, both inductive and abductive reasoning require that various
factors be pondered and integrated in optimal ways into epistemic decisions. “Ascend-
ing to the grounds” of a given [q] is striving for its best explanation among possible
competing options. It requires abilities such as inventive talent, delight in exploration,
patience, perseverance, humility and so on that reach beyond the steadiness of rule
applying. Drawing on the results of abductive and inductive procedures, Bolzanian
knowing is highly dependent on the efficiency of epistemic virtues.
The fact that Bolzano dissuades us from taking any apparent immediacy as a guar-
antee of infallibility abrogates the principle that knowing is attributable on the basis
of subjective immediacy of foundational judgments. Whether a truth is foundational
cannot be decided by immediacy of judgment, but can only be decided by working out
abductive procedures. The results of abductive procedures, the first (or last) grounds,
involve various decisions made on the way ascending to these grounds. These decisions
are, consequently, part of Bolzanian knowing of foundational truth. They include, for
example, decisions on where to stop investigations in order not to give them dispro-
portional weight (Bolzano 1837a §332.3). Appropriate decisions require evaluative
agentive properties, comparable to those by which artists apply the appropriate brush-
stroke or fit in the right word, or those by which wise people are aware of where to
initiate or to stop certain actions. The moment to intervene in children’s strife, for
example, is not determinable by consulting a deontic precept. Rather, it requires the
application of a wide range of skills and experience, as well as the virtues of wisdom,
understanding, foresight, fairness and so on. Situations like that are characterized by
their involvement of different and contradicting values. Virtues are those properties
that can assess the diversity of values involved in a situation, working out cognitively
and emotionally balanced responses to it. In the epistemic case, a virtuous approach
works out a balanced response to the values of good reasons, the force of evidence,
the strength of counterarguments, the relevance of contextual aspects and so on.
An aretaic approach to knowledge does not deny the necessity of mandatory pre-
cepts in the pursuit of truth. Rather, it emphasizes that the primary accent of the
normative dimension in epistemological concerns is not the deontic character of rule-
following, but the fact that epistemic duties warrant the success of epistemic activity
when they are based in virtues. Bolzano’s heuristics demonstrates how duty and virtue
27 Valuable “cogitation” (Nachdenken) is “directed to truth” or “searching for truth” (Bolzano 1837a §322).
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enlace in epistemic attempts: it provides, on the one hand, a collection of rules for
one’s “behavior in thinking”, a “directive for thinking” which “ought to be observed”
to successfully increase knowledge, and, on the other hand, explicitly resumes aspects
of cogitation that are subject to what an agent “earnestly wants”, and hence to the ethics
of believing (Bolzano 1837a §§322, 324). The heart of Bolzano’s heuristics consists in
a body of “general rules”, among which the following three deserve specific attention
in the present context: “Tentative supposition or indirect method” (rule no. 5, §329),
“Consulting judgments of others and experience” (rule no. 7, §331), “Testing one”s
own judgments” (rule no. 8, §332).
Heuristic rule no. 5 resumes the hypothetical method that “attempts to find truth by
means of something that is not yet known to be true” (Bolzano 1837a §329.1). It com-
bines with rule no. 8—testing one’s judgments—to achieve the twofold goal of testing
a seemingly immediate judgment by ascending to the grounds of the asserted truth.
Bolzano admits that due to the involvement of the unknown in the procedure of know-
ing, the hypothetical method seems “artificial”, “inverted” or “indirect” compared to
the “natural” method of inferring known truth from known truth. Practicing exclusively
the “natural” method of deduction—which presupposes assertion of grounds before
assertion of consequences—restricts, however, knowledge extension in an unhealthy
manner. People stubbornly insisting on deductive knowing as the only appropriate
kind of knowing might appear stupid since all their cogitating may happen to lead to
no significant result. On the other hand, the “inverted” methods are “amiss” in that
they involve “haphazardness” and the favors of “serendipity”—and hence fallibility
(Bolzano 1837a §330). Bolzano suggests that only a combination of “natural” and
“inverted” methods allows accounting for knowing, and that the art of combining
them ideally is highly determined by virtues.
Ascending to the “first grounds” of a set of truths requires the application of the
hypothetical method that cannot rule out fallibility; nevertheless, faultiness is mini-
mized if we choose our tentative suppositions “with proper skillfulness” and “perform
the examination in all ways available to us” (Bolzano 1837a §329.2). The required
skillfulness enables agents to select those propositions that are potentially expedient
as hypothetical grounds for a given statement. “Proper skills” for this task evaluate the
propositions’ probability, their simplicity or their convenience for experiments with
regard to the statement to be founded and the circumstances of investigation. Within
the set of selected propositions, they can further establish a hierarchy that determines
the sequence of examination (Bolzano 1837a §329.3). The soundness of the potential
explanans can be examined progressively by checking the truth-values of proposi-
tions entailed by it, or again regressively by applying the hypothetical method to the
hypothetical grounds themselves. For general statements, induction is another appro-
priate method of examination that implies various epistemic and experiential skills
(Bolzano 1837a §329.8). Sometimes, so Bolzano claims, it may even suffice to “think”
the proposition to be examined “as clearly as possible”, including representing it “in
words or signs of another kind”. This may lead us to “see” its evidence or to remember
other occasions when we already considered its truth or falsity. While choosing the
appropriate combination of these methods in the circumstances belongs to epistemic
skillfulness, epistemic virtue requires us “not to take a proposition for true just because
it pops up in our mind or appears there very vividly” (Bolzano 1837a §329.4). Bolzano
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does not exclude subjective evidence as a relevant factor for truth-conduciveness, but
he shows that epistemically virtuous agents will not unconditionally rely upon it.
To help us to decide which combination of methods is the most promising in search-
ing the grounds of a given truth, Bolzano suggests some pragmatic rules or principles.
They are inspired, on the one hand, by the strong probabilistic nature of his logic and
semantics, and, on the other hand, by consequentialist values. One such rule states that
judgments must be tested only in cases in which “we see that a test is possible without
assuming propositions that have less reliability than they have themselves”. If the latter
is the case, we could at best corroborate the tested judgment but not refute it. Hence,
if its eligible reasons are only less reliable propositions, we can “confidently desist
from such testing” (Bolzano 1837a §332.7). It is obvious that the “reasons” mentioned
here are supposed to refer to the objective grounds of the proposition [q] asserted in
“q!”, and not merely to its “epistemic reasons” that factually led us to assert “q!”. The
reliability of propositions can be accounted for in terms of their relational property of
probability. Contrary to a proposition’s intrinsic truth or falsity, a proposition’s proba-
bility is a relational property depending on a certain set of propositions. Probability is
explained—as deducibility is—by a principle of truth-preserving under conditions of
variability of terms. It is a triadic relation between two sets of propositions and some
constitutive representations:
A proposition [q] is probable with regard to a class [P] of propositions and
with regard to a variable constituent [c] if a variation of [c] generating only true
propositions in [P] generates not only true propositions in [Q]. (Bolzano 1837a
§161)
Similarly, a proposition [q] is deducible from [P] with regard to [c] if a variation
of [c] generating only true propositions in [P] generates only true propositions in
[Q]. With regard to the relation between deducibility and probability, we may say
with Jan Berg that probability is a weaker case of deducibility, or with Joëlle Proust
that deducibility is the ideal limit case of probability with value 1.28 Evaluating the
probability of potential grounds [P] of [q] and comparing it to the probability of [q]
requires a uniform reference set of propositions. In scientific work, for example, it
is common practice to consider a stock of well-established tenets as unquestionable.
Such a set can be used to “probabilize” the propositions to be examined, as well as the
potential grounds [P] that are considered to explain them. Against this background
set, we evaluate whether a suggested candidate [p] for grounding [q] has or has not
the strength of higher probability than [q].
28
“To say that a proposition P is derivable from the set  of propositions with respect to a sequence
of ideas-as-such is tantamount to saying that the conditional proposition: if  is true, then P is true, is
universally valid with respect to the sequence in question—in other words, that the degree of validity of this
conditional is 1 with respect to the sequence. It is near at hand, then, to consider weaker cases of derivability
where the conditional has a lower degree of validity. In this way Bolzano is led to his notion of probability.
[…] This notion of probability is the logical relation of an hypothesis to its evidential support. Hence,
Bolzano’s notion of probability has the formal properties of the concept of conditional probability” (Berg
2000, p. 54).
“Derivability […] is an extreme case of the relationship of probability. […] When the ‘comparative valid-
ity’ of the proposition Mwith respect to A, B, C, D… is less than 1, there is no longer any relationship of
derivability, but a relationship of probability” (Proust 1989, p. 89).
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It is rare, however, that epistemic agents in the evaluation of their assertions
unconditionally rely on a completely determined reference set of propositions. Even if
the axioms of an axiomatic science or the dogmas of a fundamentalist religion provide
models for absolute reference sets, scientists at least will admit that their first principles
stand in certain dependence relations to propositions external to the system. Bolzano
mentions such mutual dependencies between different domains of knowledge in the
introduction to the Theory of science. Admitting dependence relations certainly does
not entail a throwback to skepticism by way of relativism, but rather a “throwforth” to
an open-mindedness that acknowledges “foundherent” relations beyond the limits of
a certain domain.29 Keeping in mind that also the seemingly most basic truths involve
a web of assumptions remedies the flaw of haughty dogmatism pretending to identify
which truths are absolutely foundational grounds.
Even in cases of assumptions that are more reliable then the tested judgment we
should weigh the costs of prolonging the investigation against the damage of error.
Bolzano honestly admits that the rule of at least equal probability for grounding prop-
ositions is itself not an immediate judgment and, therefore, exposed to the “danger
of error”. This danger, however, is considered more minor than “being determined by
any other rule or by mere accident” with respect to the judgments to be tested.30 Since
neither doubt nor trust is subject to unconditional randomness, a remaining unavoid-
able possibility of error is not a good reason to reject a given truth (Bolzano 1837a
§332.7, annotation). This epistemic moral reflects an advice given by Kohelet accord-
ing to which one should not become “overly righteous”.31 Being overly concerned
with testing the ultimate possible reason for and especially against each judgment
made would destroy one’s epistemic health.32 It would be as insane as taking each
apparently immediate judgment as being unquestionably truth-conforming.
As heuristic rule no. 7—“Consulting judgments of others and experience”—
suggests, an important factor for making proper decisions regarding the ways and
length of explanatory investigation is the experience from shared epistemic practices.
Under the concept of “common sense” (gemeiner Menschenverstand) Bolzano sub-
sumes performances of consensus and common semiotic systems without specifying,
however, whether the term “common” is to be understood in a distributive or in a
collective sense. In the first case, “common sense” would refer to a general property
of all human beings; that is, to the kind of understanding that all of them have due
to their nature. In the second case, the term would refer to a property that human
beings have together, to a kind of understanding that grows out of their practical
and mental interactions. In view of some remarks and expressions—especially in
29 For the concept of “foundherency” see Haack (1993).
30 A rule inferior in this respect is the Cartesian rule of universal doubt (or its weaker version of universal
testing), which is criticized for being impracticable. Since it is never possible to test all our judgments, we
need a principle of selection in order to decide which judgments may remain untested. But exactly this
principle is missing in the Cartesian rule of universal doubt.
31
“Don’t be overly righteous, neither make yourself overly wise. Why should you destroy yourself?”
(Bible: Kohelet 7, p. 16).
32 In his Von der weisen Selbsttäuschung (On Wise Self-Deception), Bolzano even praises deception and
error as “sometimes useful […] even for the most wise and virtuous of our species” (Bolzano 1976, p. 111).
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Bolzano 1837a §331—I am inclined to favor the second interpretation, at least for
some occurrences of the term “common sense”.33 Collective epistemic properties
imply not merely “social routes to knowledge” but also the shared intentionality of
“collective epistemic agents”.34 Collective epistemology takes epistemic agents to be
“deliberators engaging in certain cognitive activities from a first person perspective”
which “marks” the rational point of view. Since the first person perspective allows for
singular and plural specification, the “locus of epistemic authority and responsibility”
can be distributed “within and across” collectives. It is held that epistemic processes
often have to be accounted for as processes of joint individual contributions. Reasons
that become “salient from the group perspective” will then have “immediacy” for
individuals, in function of their group membership.35
One manifestation of “common sense” is consensus, considered by Bolzano as
“a particular indicator of a judgment’s truth”, especially when “the proposition itself
is not doubted in spite of dissent about its ground” (Bolzano 1837a §315.6). The claim
that a consensual assertion “q!” indicates its truth-conformity is admittedly poignant
in those cases where the reasons given for the assertion are not only different but
conflicting. Cases of convergence in judgment in spite of diverging reasons seem to
be paradigmatic for the need to search for the best explanation of the asserted truth.
Insofar, reliance on consensus is not the mere “faith of optimists” or the contingent
“fashion” of a “party spirit”.36 Accounting for Bolzanian knowing requires consider-
ing all the processes involved in infallibility evaluation. None of them can provide per
se the ultimate warrant for infallibility. Epistemically virtuous agents will take con-
sensus on [q] not as a license for dogmatic insistence on their assertion’s infallibility,
but rather as a motive for increasing the search for grounds. Combining trust in the
judgment’s truth-conformity with virtues like prudence and curiosity in a balanced
way creates the integrity warranting a successful search for the best explanation. Con-
sensual trust in [q] is an ideal starting point to engage in exploration and comparison
of the most promising explanations of [q].37
Similarly, shared semiotic systems are important tools in the task of evaluating
infallibility. Bolzano holds that thoughts shaped in purely subjective ideas, that is, in
mere “mentalese”, are too ephemeral for objective tests of truth-conformity. Such test-
ing requires us to get thoughts “into our grip”, so that they can be recalled “as often as
33 For instance, Bolzano equates a judgment that “almost all human beings” avow “as with One mouth”
with an “utterance of the common sense” (Bolzano 1837a §331.4).
34 Cf. Gilbert (2004); Tollefsen (2007).
35 Tollefsen (2007).
36
“Furthermore, even if all who investigate will converge on a given opinion, that does not make it true.
[...] The conviction that convergence coincides with truth is the faith of optimists, not part of a proper
definition of truth”; “[W]hen we form beliefs, we frequently rely on the consensus of others to guide us […]
In the […] case, where agreement is used as evidence to settle belief, one is pursuing truth for oneself, and
the agreement of others is simply taken as diagnostic of truth. Agreement, however, is not always diagnostic
of truth” (Goldman 1999, pp. 12, 71).
37 Bolzano gives the example of the “doctrine of the imperishability of substances” that we can adopt with
full confidence, even if all the reasons philosophers provide in order to prove it should be untenable. This
truth is taken to be deeply rooted in human reason (Vernunft), since “even assuming a beginning one cannot
think of an end of substances” (Bolzano 1838, p. 71f).
123
Synthese (2011) 183:27–45 43
we like”. This purpose is achieved by the use of adequate signs whose function is “to
apprehend thoughts that rushed through our soul and to subject them to more accurate
testing” (Bolzano 1837a §344.13). Especially complex representations are dependent
on adequate signs that serve as the “bonding agent” or “cement” of their elements
(Bolzano 1837a §344.12; §334.3–5). Bolzano does not advance anything like a “pri-
vate language argument”, but the way he discusses a theory of signs (Bolzano 1837a
§§334–344) as part of heuristics makes it clear that he considers a semiotic system
to be essentially the result of inter-subjective endeavor. Although semiotic systems
are conventional, they aim at avoiding arbitrariness and misunderstanding. They cash
the mass of subjective representations into a currency that enables intra- and inter-
subjective trade with truth and explanation. One interest of such trade clearly lies in
making thoughts available to objective testing. Other advantages of the use of signs
are the possibility of longer inferential series, a better survey of epistemic processes
and the chance of being led to new and unexpected thoughts by random assemblies of
signs (Bolzano 1837a §334.6–8). All these functions play relevant roles in infallibility
evaluation, although none of them can warrant infallibility in its own right.
6 Conclusion
Bolzanian knowing is introduced as a reflective attitude that epistemic agents take
towards their own assertions. The “reflection” is supposed to reveal the assertion’s
value of infallibility. This evaluation involves explanatory attempts at “ascending” to
potential grounds of the asserted truth. The endeavor of explaining asserted truths
involves not only the rules of “inverted” methods, but also subjective decisions requir-
ing a combination of skills and character traits. None of the rules mentioned can
guarantee infallibility, and neither can skills nor virtuous character traits, nor any
specific combination of these factors. It seems to follow then that Bolzanian heuris-
tics annuls the possibility of Bolzanian knowing. We are doomed to accept that all
reflective attitudes rest on the approximations of the “best possible” evaluation of an
assertion’s fallibility, and hence fall into the scope of Bolzanian believing.
We can accept this verdict with a shrug—after all, there seems to be nothing bad in
assuming that reflective assessment of one’s assertions is always striving for the “best
possible” evaluation and that the “perfect” borderline case is just an ideal, a construct
helping us to not lose sight of our goal. We can say, in this case, that Bolzanian know-
ing is accounted for by the following analysis:
(4) A knowsB that [q] iff A believesB that [q] & A’s evaluation of her asserting [q]
as fallible reveals a high probability of [q].
This analysis can be related to the claims of Bolzanian epistemic ethics that demand
to call a proposition “secure” if its probability “for a certain being is very large and if
there are circumstances which make it foolish or illicit to consider the possibility of
the opposite” (Bolzano 1837b §317.3). In such circumstances—so we might claim—
there is not only a right to call the asserted proposition “secure”, but also a right to
consider our attitude as “knowing”.
Earlier in this paper, I suggested another option for dealing with the insufficiencies
of infallibility evaluation that allows for a more substantial distinction of Bolzanian
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knowing from believing. To provide the value of the absolute to knowing, we might
resort to the idea of a decisional “leap” that leaves probability considerations behind.
Let us assume that the attitude of believing implies awareness of potential error,
whereas the attitude of knowing is the result of a decision to set at nought such aware-
ness. Knowing then appears as an attitude whose salient virtue is not trust but rather
audaciousness. Instead of trusting in the truth-conformity of her fallible assertion, the
knowing agent dares to state the infallibility of her assertion. Such an approach can
be accounted for by the following analysis:
(5) A knowsB that [q] iff A asserts [q] & A evaluates her asserting [q] & A audaciously
decides that her evaluation reveals infallibility.
It is not clear how satisfactory such an analysis of knowledge can be. First, it allows
two agents in identical epistemic situations with identical epistemic background to
have different attitudes toward their assertion “q!”: While agent A believes that [q]
because her salient virtue is prudence, agent B knows that [q] because her salient vir-
tue is audaciousness. Second, there is the problem of virtues being gradual properties,
turning into vices when they reach a certain degree or when they become dominant.
Audaciousness is valuable not per se, but only in the appropriate situation and in
an appropriate measure. It may be, however, that such a “decisional” conception of
knowledge fits the purpose of settling the epistemic status of foundational principles
in axiomatic systems. For the pragmatic purpose of working with such principles it is
an advantage to attribute to them the status of being known to be the fundamentals.
And it is an advantage to keep the sense of this “being known” stronger than that of
“being believed”. It is wise to keep in mind, however, that rash decisions to “leap”
into knowledge might testify to vicious rather than virtuous audaciousness.
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